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Abstract 
Using data on listed banks in 51 countries, we analyze whether banks’ dividend payouts are 
influenced by the relative strengths of the agency conflicts faced by their shareholders and 
creditors. We show that dividend policy depends on the relative strengths of these agency 
conflicts, but with a more decisive role played by the agency cost of equity than the one of debt, 
in contrast to results found in the literature on non-financial firms. We then further investigate 
whether those relationships are shaped by differences in funding structure, levels of 
capitalization and capital stringency, and potential differences in external corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
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1. Introduction 
 The dividend policy of banks has moved into the regulatory spotlight recently, with both the 
Federal Reserve Board (FRB, 2011) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 
2011) emphasizing the necessity to increase oversight of bank dividend payouts. This focus is at 
least in part motivated by the fact that some banks distributed large dividend payouts during the 
2007-2008 financial crisis despite incurring heavy unanticipated losses (Acharya et al., 2011). 
This could seem surprising, as a bank distributing earnings as dividends reduces its ability to 
retain capital internally, and thus transfers default risk to bank creditors and the deposit insurer.  
 It is well known, however, that dividends play an important role in mitigating the agency 
conflict between managers and shareholders, as paying dividends reduces the amount of free 
cash flow at managers’ disposal for potential extraction of private benefits (Easterbrook, 1984; 
Jensen, 1986; Zwiebel, 1996). Furthermore, while paying dividends may weaken the agency 
conflict of equity between managers and shareholders, it may actually strengthen the agency 
conflict between debtholders and shareholders, through wealth transfer between the two; 
managers might be under pressure from debtholders to reduce dividend payments as a 
consequence. Hence, managers face conflicting pressures that might have an impact on their 
dividend policies; these pressures will depend on the relative strengths of shareholders’ and 
debtholders’ influence and incentives. While there is an extensive literature analyzing whether 
dividend policies are used as a corporate mechanism to reduce agency conflicts in the case of 
non-financial firms, few empirical papers analyze it for financial firms, despite being of great 
importance for both policymakers and regulators. The distribution of earnings as dividends 
obviously reduces banks’ ability to generate capital internally, and can thereby transfer default 
risk to their creditors, the deposit insurer and potentially, ultimately, the taxpayer. Our paper 
aims to contribute to an empirical evaluation of the influence of both shareholders and 
debtholders on bank dividend policy in this context. Banks are highly leveraged with a large 
proportion of their debtholders benefitting from a deposit insurance system, reducing their 
incentives to exert pressure on managers to cut dividend payments. If the pressure exerted by 
shareholders is stronger than that of debtholders, this could represent one of the explanations for 
why banks continue to pay dividends even during periods of economic difficulty. 
 The existing literature on payout policy, mostly focusing on non-financial firms, has directed 
most of its attention to the agency conflict between managers and shareholders (e.g. Denis et al., 
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1994; Yoon & Starks, 1995; Li & Zhao 2008); only recently some papers also analyze the impact 
of the agency conflict between shareholders and debtholders on dividend policy. These papers 
generally conclude that creditors play a more decisive role than shareholders in determining the 
dividend policy of non-financial firms (Brockman & Unlu, 2009; Chu, 2017; Shao et al., 2013; 
Tsai & Wu, 2015). Among the small number of papers that have started putting emphasis on the 
role of debtholders in bank dividend policy,
e
 Srivastav et al. (2014) examine the role of debt-
based CEO compensation on U.S. banks’ payout policy, showing that CEO incentives stemming 
from inside debt influence bank payout policy in a manner that protects debtholder interests. 
Onali et al. (2015) show that the presence of government officials on the board of directors of 
European listed banks shapes managers’ incentives in favor of bank creditors and leads to lower 
payout ratios. However, the potential impact of the balancing strategy faced by bank managers 
stemming from the conflicts of interest of shareholders and debtholders has not been examined to 
date.  
 Our aim is to contribute to the literature on bank dividend policy by examining how banks’ 
dividend policy depends on the relative strength of the various agency conflicts occurring 
between different stakeholders, and how it is influenced by banks’ specific funding structure and 
the regulatory environment facing the banking industry. The incentives for both depositors and 
uninsured debtholders to discipline managers might be weaker than those of shareholders. Only 
large depositors would demand that managers pay less dividends in the presence of a deposit 
insurance system, while the implementation of implicit government guarantees, such as bail-out 
packages, may reduce uninsured creditors’ incentives to monitor bank managers (Gropp et al., 
2014; Karas et al., 2013). Moreover, debtholders might be more confident to recover their claims 
and thus will have less incentive to pressure managers to cut dividends in countries where 
supervisors are stricter in their approach to assess and verify the degree of capital at risk in 
banks. We further examine potential differences in external corporate governance mechanisms, 
motivated by existing literature on non-financial firms which finds that market competition 
(Grullon & Michaely, 2012; Knyazeva & Knyazeva, 2012) and transparent and well-functioning 
                                                          
e
 As for non-financial firms, the existing literature on bank dividend policy has paid most of its attention to the 
agency conflict between managers and shareholders, showing that dividend payments are used as a signaling 
mechanism to convince shareholders that they will not be expropriated (Abreu & Gulamhussen, 2013; Bessler & 
Nohel, 1996; Dickens et al., 2002; Filbeck & Mullienaux, 1993, 1999; Floyd et al., 2015; Theis & Dutta, 2009). 
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markets (Brockman & Unlu, 2011) can be either substitutes or complements to dividend policies 
in reducing agency conflicts.  
 To carry out our empirical investigation, we follow La Porta et al. (2000) and Brockman and 
Unlu (2009) in proxying the strength of the agency costs of equity and debt by the level of 
shareholder protection and creditor rights, respectively. We use a panel of 1,148 listed banks 
from 51 countries with considerable heterogeneity in shareholder and creditor rights across 
countries. Limiting our analysis to listed banks having a dispersed ownership structure allows us 
to focus on the two potential agency conflicts between managers vs shareholders and 
shareholders vs creditors. We find that bank managers strike a balance in their dividend policy 
that depends on the relative strength of the agency conflicts faced by their shareholders and 
creditors, with however a more decisive role played by shareholders. We also find that dividend 
payments are used by managers to reinforce their reputation as perceived by debtholders when 
banks’ levels of capital stringency or of market funding are low, and also in the presence of 
either strong competition in the banking market, well-functioning financial markets, or strong 
law enforcement. Our results further demonstrate that dividend payments are used by managers 
to signal to shareholders that they will not be expropriated, independently of bank funding 
structure, well-functioning financial markets or competition in the banking market. This implies 
that, for shareholders, the potential to be expropriated is not reduced by any of these factors. 
Furthermore, we observe that dividend payments do not depend on the strength of the agency 
costs of equity and debt for banks with low capital adequacy ratios, indicating that managers are 
restrained from using dividends as a signaling instrument when regulatory capital levels are low. 
 Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our study contributes to the wider 
literature examing how bank regulation impacts on bank behavior, which is of particular 
importance in our context as dividend policy in itself may have consequences for the 
implemenation of common bank capital regulation. Second, we contribute to the literature on 
corporate payouts by analyzing if bank managers adopt a balancing strategy in their dividend 
policy that depends on the relative strengths of the agency conflicts faced by their shareholders 
and debtholders. Third, our results are relevant for bank governance more particularly, as banks’ 
highly leveraged funding structures in connection with the deposit insurance guarantees enjoyed 
by some, if not all, creditors might significantly interfere with agency conflicts between their 
stakeholders more generally. 
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 Section 2 now discusses related literature and the hypotheses tested; Section 3 describes our 
empirical sample and the proxies used to measure the strength of the agency cost of equity and 
debt; Section 4 outlines the methodology used to test our hypotheses; Section 5 presents and 
discusses our main results; Section 6 examines further issues and carries out several robustness 
checks, and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Review of related literature and hypotheses tested 
 Following the seminal contributions of Jensen and Meckling (1976), a large strand of the 
theoretical literature demonstrates that dividend policies address agency conflicts between 
managers and shareholders (Easterbrook (1984); Jensen (1986); Zwiebel (1996); Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989); Gomes (2000); Chae et al. (2009)). Several empirical studies, mainly 
focussing on U.S. non-financial firms, find that dividends are used by managers to communicate 
information to shareholders when there is a conflict of interest (Denis et al., 1994; Healy & 
Palepu, 1988; Yoon & Starks, 1995), whereas other studies do not find evidence that dividends 
are used as a signaling device (Benartzi et al., 1997; Li & Zhao, 2008). La Porta, et al. (2000) 
furthermore contrast empirically the outcome hypothesis that non-financial firms’ dividend 
payments increase in the strength of shareholder rights, and the substitution hypothesis that those 
located in countries with weaker shareholder rights pay more dividends to bolster their 
reputation; they find support for the outcome model, showing that dividend policies depend on 
the legal protection of shareholders.  
 Of similar importance is the agency conflict of debt, which arises between shareholders and 
debtholders. Shareholders can transfer wealth from debtholders by choosing strategies that 
increase debtholders’ risk. First, managers can take on riskier projects than the risk profile of 
their current portfolio, benefiting shareholders while shifting risk to debtholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Second, managers in a firm with risky debt financing may engage in 
suboptimal investment, and instead use the funds to pay dividends to shareholders (Kalay, 1982; 
Myers, 1977). Dividend policies can be used to solve this agency problem by paying lower levels 
of dividends.  
 The balancing strategy faced by managers stemming from the conflicting interests of 
shareholders and debtholders was examined for the case of non-financial firms by Brockman and 
Unlu (2009), who empirically investigate the impact of the agency costs of equity and debt on 
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non-financial firms’ dividend policy. Analogously to La Porta, et al. (2000), they proxy the 
relative strengths of the agency cost of equity and debt with the level of shareholder protection 
and creditor rights. Brockman and Unlu (2009) additionally hypothesize that low dividend 
payments serve as a substitute mechanism for weak creditor rights, as managers will be more 
likely to consent to restrictive dividend policy when creditor rights are weak, in order to build 
reputation in financial markets. Their results show that weak creditor rights lead to lower 
dividend payouts while weak shareholder rights are associated with higher dividend payments, in 
line with the substitution hypothesis and the outcome hypothesis, respectively. They further find 
that creditors play a more decisive role in determining the dividend policy of non-financial firms 
than shareholders. Shao, et al. (2013) find further evidence that the substitution hypothesis 
between non-financial firms’ dividend policy and weak creditor rights only holds in countries 
with strong shareholder protection. Another strand of literature analyses the conflict of interest 
between shareholders and creditors using the stock and bond price reactions to specific corporate 
events (Billett et al., 2004). Using the announcement of unexpected dividend changes, Tsai and 
Wu (2015) highlight a positive relationship between unexpected changes of dividend payments 
and bond returns. This result indicates that bondholders perceive such changes either as a signal 
sent by managers about firm profitability or as a way to prevent empire building, and not as a 
wealth transfer from creditors to shareholders. Another approach used in the literature to measure 
the strength of the shareholder-creditor conflict relies on the existence of dual holders who 
simultaneously hold equity and debt claims of the same firm (Bodnaruk & Rossi, 2016; Jiang et 
al., 2010). Building on this approach, Chu (2017) shows that firms pay lower dividends when 
there is diminished conflict between shareholders and creditors; this suggests that the 
shareholder-creditor conflict leads firms to higher pay outs to the detriment of creditors. What 
emerges from this literature on non-financial firms is that creditors appear to play a more 
decisive role than shareholders in determining the dividend policy of non-financial firms. In 
contrast, we would expect creditors playing a less determinant role than shareholders in bank 
dividend policy.  
 Banks have several characteristics that distinguish them from other industries, and are heavily 
regulated in response to significant negative externalities associated with their failure. Banks are 
highly leveraged and have heterogeneous sources of funding, which can come from both retail 
depositors and wholesale funding, each of which might behave differently in regard to bank 
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dividend policies. Banks generally have a large number of small depositors, which either have 
little incentive to monitor managers individually due to a free rider problem, or are covered by 
deposit insurance. Moreover, uninsured creditors’ incentives to discipline managers may depend 
on the implementation of implicit government guarantees, such as bail-out packages, which may 
reduce incentives to monitor bank managers (Gropp, et al., 2014; Karas, et al., 2013). This leads 
us to examine the following hypothesis: 
H1: Agency conflicts related to shareholders dominate those related to debtholders in the 
determination of bank dividend policy.  
 
 However, Kauko (2012) theoretically shows that dividends can be an important source of 
information for uninsured depositors as a potential signal of both proﬁtability and liquidity. 
Banks have been shown to use dividends to signal asset quality and liquidity, particularly during 
periods of ﬁnancial turmoil (Calomiris & Nissim, 2014; Forti & Schiozer, 2015). Banks that 
strongly rely on wholesale funding might threfore have stronger incentives to put pressure on 
managers to pay less dividends, in particular in countries with weak creditor rights. This leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
H2: The impact of agency conflicts related to debtholders is stronger the greater the extent of 
bank market funding and the weaker are creditor rights.  
 
 Regulatory constraints on bank capital may also influence managerial decisions on dividend 
payments. Agency conflicts between shareholders and debtholders might matter less in countries 
with higher capital stringency, i.e. where supervisors are stricter in their approach to assess and 
verify the degree of capital at risk in banks. In such an environment, creditors would be more 
confident that banks are sound and thus not view larger dividends as an expropriation 
mechanism. We examine this issue through the following hypothesis: 
H3: Agency conflicts related to debtholders have a greater impact on dividend policy in 
countries with weaker capital stringency. 
 
 Independently of this, banks that are well-capitalized would generally be exposed to dividend 
policy that is driven by the conflicting pressures brought by shareholders and debtholders. 
However, when banks are undercapitalized, their dividend policy might be driven by conflicting 
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influences. During periods of stress, banks need to reach a balance between retaining capital 
within the bank and sending a negative signal to market participants by cutting dividends. As 
reducing dividends should be less costly than issuing capital, shareholders and creditors might 
put equal pressure on managers to increase the regulatory capital ratio by cutting dividends. In 
line with this argument, consistent with the precautionary view of bank capital (Berger et al., 
2008), several studies find that undercapitalized banks make lower dividend payments (Abreu & 
Gulamhussen, 2013; Casey & Dickens, 2000; Theis & Dutta, 2009). This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: Agency conflicts related to both shareholders and debtholders have a lesser impact on bank 
dividend policy for undercapitalized banks. 
 
 We next present the data, the variables we construct and the methodology we use to examine 
these hypotheses.  
 
3. Data and measures of agency conflicts 
3.1 Sample selection 
 We focus on banks in the 72 countries for which Djankov et al. (2008b) and Djankov et al. 
(2007) report information on both shareholder rights and creditor rights, which we use as proxies 
for agency cost of equity and agency cost of debt, respectively. As we concentrate on the 
potential agency conflicts between managers vs shareholders and shareholders vs creditors, we 
only use for our analysis listed banks with a dispersed ownership structure.  
 We extract annual financial statement data from BvD Bankscope for the 2001 to 2014 period 
for bank holding companies, commercial banks, cooperative banks, and savings banks, using 
consolidated statements when available, and unconsolidated ones otherwise.
 f
 BvD Bankscope 
provides financial statement data for 3,235 active banks for at least some of the period 
considered. Following La Porta, et al. (2000), we exclude countries with mandatory dividend 
rules (i.e., legal requirements that dividends have to be larger than some fraction of net income), 
which are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, Venezuela, and Uruguay. We further exclude New 
Zealand, as in Leaven and Levine (2009), as almost all banks there are subsidiaries of Australian 
                                                          
f
 For most banks globally, with the exception of the US, financial statement data is not consistently available on a 
quarterly basis.  
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banks. After these exclusions, we have 66 countries left with 2,787 banks. After eliminating 
banks without information regarding dividends, we are left with 2,368 banks. Furthermore, as 
our objective is to focus on the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers, we 
further exclude the 371 banks for which the largest shareholder holds more than 51% of the 
shares. We also exclude the 672 banks for which we do not have information on their ownership 
structure, using either BvD Bankscope, Bloomberg, Thomson One Banker or their annual report 
when available. This leaves us with 1,325 banks. We also exclude observations where banks 
have negative dividends, negative equity to total assets, and dividends to net income ratios 
greater than 100%. After some further data cleaning of bank-level variables and requiring banks 
to have complete information on the relevant bank-level and country-level variables, we end up 
with a final sample of 1,148 banks (7,336 observations) from 51 countries; Table A1 in 
Appendix A gives a breakdown of these by country.  
 
3.2. Proxies for strength of agency conflicts 
  
 We follow La Porta et al. (1998) by proxying the strength of the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders (agency cost of equity) with the anti-director index 
(ShareholderRightsj), computed by La Porta, et al. (1998) and revised by Djankov, et al. (2008b). 
This index measures the level of shareholder rights for each country, i.e. the legal protection of 
shareholders against expropriation by managers through several measures: (i) if a country allows 
shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (ii) whether or not shareholders are required to 
deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting, (iii) whether cumulative voting 
or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed, (iv) if an 
oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (v) if the minimum percentage of share capital that 
entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to 
10 percent (the sample median), and (vi) if shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be 
waived by a shareholders’ vote. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with a higher value indicating 
better shareholder rights (see Table 1).  
 We proxy the strength of the agency conflict between shareholders and debtholders (agency 
cost of debt) by using the creditor rights index (CreditorRightsj), as in Brockman and Unlu 
(2009). This index, taken from La Porta, et al. (1998) and Djankov, et al. (2007), measures the 
legal protection of creditors in case of reorganization or liquidation of the debtor. It represents 
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several elements: (i) if creditors’ consent is required to file for reorganization, (ii) if secured 
creditors are able to take possession of collateral assets once the reorganization petition has been 
approved (no automatic stay), (iii) if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the 
proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm, and (iv) whether the 
debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the 
reorganization. The index ranges from 0 to 4, with higher values indicating stronger creditor 
protection (see Table 1).  
[Insert Table 1] 
 
3.3. Some descriptive statistics 
 Dividends are expressed as the dividends to net income ratio (DPijt), the payout ratio decided 
by banks. It is the most commonly used measure of dividend payouts and captures the main 
element of the payout policy (Byrne & O'Connor, 2012; Francis et al., 2011; Mitton, 2004; 
Onali, 2014). The comparison of the dividend payout ratio between countries with relatively 
weak and strong levels of shareholder and creditor rights shows that we have substantial 
heterogeneity in shareholder and creditor rights across countries (see Table A1 in Appendix A).  
Table 2 further shows that banks located in countries with weaker shareholder rights have 
significantly higher dividend payouts than banks in countries with stronger shareholder rights, in 
line with the substitution hypothesis of La Porta, et al. (2000). We further observe that banks pay 
lower dividends in countries with weaker creditor rights; this is consistent with the substitution 
hypothesis of Brockman and Unlu (2009), with banks paying dividends as a substitute to weaker 
creditor rights to build their reputation.  
[Insert Table 2] 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Empirical specifications 
We use different specifications to test our four hypotheses developed above. 
 
Specification to test hypothesis H1 
We first investigate whether the strength of the agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders and between shareholders and debtholders have an impact on bank dividend policy, 
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and whether the agency conflicts related to shareholders dominate those related to debtholders. 
For that, we estimate the following equation: 
 
𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑗 +  
                                      ∑ 𝜃𝑚𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  
𝑛𝑚
        (1) 
                            
where subscript i denotes bank; j denotes country; t the time period, and ε is the idiosyncratic 
error term. DPijt is the dividend payout of bank i in country j at date t; ShareholderRightsj and 
CreditorRightsj are proxies measuring the strength of the agency conflicts of equity and the 
agency conflict of debt, respectively. BankControlijt are bank control variables, and 
CountryControljt are country control variables, as defined later in Section 4.2. 
 We expect the coefficients associated with ShareholderRightsj and CreditorRightsj to be 
significant if the agency conflicts related to shareholders and to debtholders influence bank 
dividend policy. However, we expect a stronger economic impact of the agency conflicts related 
to shareholders compared with those related to debtholders to be in line with hypothesis H1. 
 A positive relationship between CreditorRightsj and dividend payouts is expected if managers 
consent to debtholders’ demands for more restrictive payout policy, as a substitute for weak 
creditor rights, with the aim to minimize the firm’s agency costs of debt. Regarding 
ShareholderRightsj, we expect a positive coefficient if shareholders with stronger rights force 
managers to pay more dividends, in line with the outcome model proposed by La Porta, et al. 
(2000). On the other hand, a negative relationship would support the substitute model of La 
Porta, et al. (2000), where dividends are considered as a substitute for legal protection. This 
implies that dividend payout ratios should be higher in countries with lower levels of shareholder 
protection than in countries with stronger levels of protection.  
 
Specification to test hypothesis H2 
We next examine whether managers have stronger pressure to pay less dividends in banks that 
strongly rely on wholesale funding, in particular in countries with weak creditor rights. For this 
we augment Eq. (1) with interaction terms between the proxies measuring the strength of agency 
conflicts and the dummy variable HighMarketFund/TFijt; the dummy variable takes the value of 
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one if the ratio of long term market funding to total funding (deposits and wholesale funding
g
)
 
is 
greater than the country-sample median, and zero otherwise.
h
 This results in the following 
specification: 
 
𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑/𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡
+   𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑/𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 
                                      ∑ 𝜃𝑚𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  
𝑛𝑚
        (2) 
 
 We expect the coefficient associated with the interaction term 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑/𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 to be significant and positive to be consistent with 
hypothesis H2 that the pressure exerted by debtholders to cut dividends is stronger the greater the 
extent of bank market funding and the weaker are creditor rights. On the other hand, we do not 
expect the coefficient associated with 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑/𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 to be 
significant as we do not expect the pressure exerted by shareholders to pay more dividends to 
depend on the magnitude of wholesale funding. 
 
Specification to test hypothesis H3 
 We furthermore investigate whether the pressure exerted by debtholders on bank 
dividend policy depends on capital regulatory requirements. In countries with high capital 
stringency, creditors might be more confident to recover their claims and thus will have less 
incentive to pressure managers to cut dividends. Hence, greater capital stringency may act as a 
substitute mechanism for dividend payments in countries with weaker creditor protection. We 
test hypothesis H3 by augmenting Eq. (1) with interaction terms between the proxies measuring 
the strength of agency conflicts and the dummy variable HighCapStringjt that takes the value of 
                                                          
g
 For data reasons, we have to exclude short term market funding to ensure that we only consider uninsured 
debtholders. Short term market funding in BvD Bankscope comprises senior debt maturing in less than one year, 
money market instruments, certificates of deposit, commercial paper, margin deposits, but also corporate deposits
 
 
(made by large commercial companies, public institutions, government agencies and large non-profit institutions) 
that benefit from the deposit insurance guarantee. We use the ratio of short term and long term market funding to 
total funding as a robustness check (see Section 6.2.).   
h
 As we only have five countries with no explicit deposit insurance over the period considered, for a low number of 
observations, and similarly only four countries that adopted a deposit insurance system throughout the period, we 
cannot use a dummy variable to differentiate these countries from the ones having an explicit deposit insurance 
scheme. Moreover, the creditor and shareholder rights indices are very similar across these countries. 
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one for countries having stronger capital stringency, and zero otherwise. This results in the 
following specification:   
 
𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡
+   𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡 
                                      ∑ 𝜃𝑚𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  
𝑛𝑚
        (3) 
 
 We use the Capital Stringency index (CapStringjt) developed by Barth et al. (2004), which 
determines the nature of capital requirements and how capital is assessed and verified by banks 
and regulators; it ranges in principle from 0 to 11, where 11 represents the highest level of capital 
stringency (see the definition in Table 1 for more details). We follow the method described by 
Barth et al. (2013) to harmonize this index across the four surveys available from the World 
Bank's Bank Regulation and Supervision program during our period of study. The dummy 
variable HighCapStringjt takes the value of one for a country if the index CapStringjt is greater 
than the cross-country median at date t, and zero otherwise. 
 We expect a greater impact of the proxy measuring the agency cost of debt on bank dividend 
policy in countries with weaker capital stringency (𝛽3 > 𝛽3 + 𝛽4) to be in line with hypothesis 
H3.  
 
Specification to test hypothesis H4 
 Finally, we examine whether the pressure exerted by shareholders and debtholders on bank 
dividend policy is weaker for undercapitalized banks. To examine this aspect we augment Eq. (1) 
with interaction terms between the proxies measuring the strength of the agency conflicts and the 
dummy variable Undercapitalizedijt, leading to the following specification: 
 
𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠. 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
+   𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠. 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 
                                      ∑ 𝜃𝑚𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  
𝑛𝑚
        (4) 
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
14 
 
 We compute bank capital as the ratio of equity to total assets (Equity/TAijt) for each bank, and 
then obtain its country median for each date t. We then classify a bank as undercapitalized at date 
t if its equity to total assets ratio is lower than the country median ratio. The dummy variable 
Undercapitalized1ijt takes the value of one if a bank is classified as undercapitalized at date t, and 
zero otherwise. We alternatively use the total regulatory capital ratio (TCRijt) to identify banks 
that are undercapitalized. A bank is in this case classified as undercapitalized if its regulatory 
capital ratio is lower than the country regulatory threshold plus two percent. We then compute 
the dummy variable Undercapitalized2ijt as taking the value of one if a bank is classified as 
undercapitalized at date t, and zero otherwise.  
 We expect, to be in line with hypothesis H4, that bank dividend payments are significantly 
influenced by the strength of the agency cost of equity and debt for well-capitalized banks 
(𝛽1 negative and 𝛽3 positive), while this should not hold for undercapitalized banks (𝛽1 +𝛽2 and 
𝛽3 +𝛽4 non significant).  
 
4.2. Control variables 
 The description and data sources of each control variable are presented in Table 1, with 
associated summary statistics. 
 We follow the existing literature and control for both individual (Xijt) and country-level (Zjt) 
effects that might also influence dividend payments. The literature on non-financial firms 
generally uses the natural logarithm of total assets (Sizeijt) for firm size, the return on assets as a 
profitability measure (ROAijt) and the asset growth rate (AssetGrowthijt) for investment 
opportunities. We expect large and more profitable banks to pay higher dividends, while banks 
with high growth opportunities can be expected to retain earnings to avoid costly equity and debt 
financing. We also control for the potential impact of taxation on dividend policy; for this we use 
data on individual income tax rates (Taxjt) provided by KPMG. The banking literature suggests 
that bank risk may increase dividend payouts due to risk-shifting motives (Acharya et al., 2013; 
Kanas, 2013; Onali, 2014); we therefore include the logarithm of a time-varying Z-score, based 
on 3-year rolling windows, (LnZscoreijt) to proxy bank default risk
i
 (see Table 1 for the 
definition).  
                                                          
i
 Higher Z-scores mean lower probabilities of default; see Lepetit and Strobel (2015) and Lepetit and Strobel (2013) 
for derivation and time-varying implementation of Z-score measures, respectively. 
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 Grullon and Michaely (2012) argue that product market competition influences managers’ 
decisions on the dividend policy of non-financial firms. To allow for this, we compute a country-
level Lerner index (Lernerjt) as the average of bank-level Lerner indices by country and by year 
(see Appendix B for more details).
j
 For this, we consider not only listed banks but also non-listed 
ones to measure the degree of competition in the entire banking system. Higher values of the 
Lerner index indicate greater market power, i.e. lower competition in the banking industry. We 
then compute a dummy variable for countries with a higher level of competition in the banking 
industry (HighCompetitionjt), taking the value of one if the Lerner index for country j at date t is 
lower than the sample median, and zero otherwise. We also follow Brockman and Unlu (2011) 
and include a variable to control for financial market development, using the market 
capitalization to GDP ratio as a proxy for financial market depth (CapDepthjt). We compute the 
dummy variable HighCapDepthjt that takes the value of one if the variable is greater than the 
sample median at date t, and zero otherwise. We also allow for possible changes in dividend 
policy during periods of banking crises by including the dummy variable (Crisisjt) that takes the 
value of one if there is a banking crisis in country j at date t (as defined in the Global Financial 
Development Database of the World Bank), and zero otherwise. Acharya, et al. (2011) report 
that banks in the U.S. and in Europe had been paying out significant dividends before the 2007-
2008 crisis, but also continued to do so during that crisis period. Kanas (2013) provides evidence 
that the Prompt Corrective Action framework was ineffective in curbing dividend behavior. 
Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013) find that even U.S. bank holding companies that were 
undercapitalized before the financial crisis of 2007-2008 paid higher dividends, but stopped 
doing so during the financial crisis when regulatory pressure was greater.  
 To complete our specification, we also include year fixed effects. For Eq. (1), we furthermore 
include the dummy variables HighMarketFund/TFijt, HighCapStringjt and Undercapitalized1ijt. 
 We check for the absence of multicollinearity problems in our core variables by computing 
the correlation matrix (see Table A2) and the variance inflation factors (VIF), which have a mean 
value of 1.98 with a maximum of 2.58. Despite the fact that the variables ShareholderRights and 
                                                          
j
 We initially computed Panzar-Rosse H-statistics, following Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Bikker et al. (2012). 
However, Panzar-Rosse H-Statistics are only valid if the market is in equilibrium in the long run. We performed the 
equilibrium test used by Claessens and Laeven (2004), and found that 23 countries (out of 51) do not satisfy this 
requirement. 
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CreditorRights have a correlation of 0.5, we do not have a collinearity problem as the standard 
errors of both ShareholderRights and CreditorRights do not inflate.  
 
4.3. Methods of estimation 
 As the shareholder and creditor protection measures are time invariant, we could use random 
effects estimation (RE), or otherwise the Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator to run Eqs. (1)-(4). To 
determine which is better, we initially estimate Eq. (1) using random effects (RE), the Hausman-
Taylor (HT) estimator and also fixed effects (FE). The Hausman specification test on FE and RE 
rejects the null hypothesis. In this case, RE is an inconsistent estimator. However, the Hausman 
test between FE and HT does not reject, indicating that HT is as consistent as FE, yet more 
efficient than FE (Baltagi et al., 2003). Thus, we use HT to estimate Eq. (1). We perform 
Hausman tests on the difference between FE and HT to test if the choice of exogenous variables 
is legitimate; we also use this test to choose the best combination that maximizes the p-value of 
the test (Baltagi, et al., 2003). We find that the variables ShareholderRightsj, CreditorRightsj, 
HighCapStringjt and HighCapDepthjt, are strictly exogenous, while all time-variant bank level 
variables are endogenous; hence, the HT estimator is used throughout. 
 Given the previous strong argument in favor of using the Hausman-Taylor estimator for our 
core specification Eq. (1), we also use the HT estimator for the subsequent specifications Eqs. 
(2)-(4), but run using subsamples defined by the corresponding dummy variables 
HighMarketFund/TFijt, HighCapStringjt, Undercapitalized1ijt and Undercapitalized2ijt. Our 
underlying rationale for taking this qualitatively equivalent approach is, firstly, that the HT 
estimator is well known to be inherently difficult to apply in specifications with interaction 
terms, as it multiplies the number of valid instruments required. Secondly, whereas we noted 
previously that there is no issue with collinearity problems between the variables 
ShareholderRightsj and CreditorRightsj themselves, this clearly cannot be said about the 
interaction terms. The interaction terms of variables ShareholderRightsj.Factors and 
CreditorRightsj.Factors
k
 in specifications Eqs. (2)-(4) are highly correlated, with correlation 
coefficients around 0.8 or higher; this implies that the estimated coefficient of the interaction 
                                                          
k
 Where Factors refer to either dummy variables HighMarketFund/TFijt, HighCapStringjt and Undercapitalized1ijt as 
in specifications Eqs. (2)-(4), respectively. The correlation for ShareholderRighst.HighMarketFund/TF and 
CreditorRighst.HighMarketFund/TF is 0.87, for ShareholderRights.HighCapString and 
CreditorRights.HighCapString is 0.86, and for Undercapitalized.HighCapString and 
Undercapitalized.HighCapString is 0.87. 
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terms will have a very high standard error due to the multicollinearity problem. We therefore 
follow Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) and Shao et al. (2013), who encounter similar problems, 
and use subsamples analysis based on Eq. (1) as a qualitatively equivalent alternative to 
augmenting the latter with interactions terms. 
 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Strength of agency conflicts and bank dividend policy 
 We report the estimation results of Eq. (1) using the Hausman Taylor (HT) estimator, random 
effects (RE) and also fixed effects (FE) in Table 3; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
bank level. Comparing the three estimators, one can observe that they produce very similar 
results, in terms of sign, significance, and magnitude; based on the specification tests carried out, 
the HT estimator (column 1) is used for the main and all further regressions. 
 Our results show that banks’ dividend payout ratios are influenced by the relative strengths of 
the agency costs of equity and debt. We find a negative and significant coefficient associated 
with the variable ShareholderRightsj, at a one percent level of confidence. These results indicate 
that bank managers located in countries with weaker shareholder rights pay higher dividends, as 
a substitute mechanism for legal protection, with the aim to bolster their reputation by signaling 
their unwillingness to expropriate shareholders. The results we find for banking firms are 
therefore markedly different from those obtained by La Porta, et al. (2000) and Brockman and 
Unlu (2009) for non-financial firms, who find evidence in favor of the outcome hypothesis. On 
the other hand, the coefficient associated with the variable CreditorRightsj is positive and 
significant at a one percent level of confidence. This is consistent with the substitution 
hypothesis of Brockman and Unlu (2009), as bank managers pay less dividends in countries with 
weak creditor rights. This result shows that bank managers consider not only the interests of 
shareholders in their dividend policy decisions, but also those of creditors. This holds even if a 
large proportion of creditors is protected by deposit insurance, and uninsured creditors might 
benefit from implicit government guarantees. Behaving in such a way will strengthen managers’ 
reputation vis-à-vis a bank’s creditors, and might thereby reduce future financing costs.  
 However, examination of the economic significance of our results shows that shareholder 
rights have a stronger impact than creditor rights in line with hypothesis H1. In particular, the 
estimation result in column 1 implies that a ten percent increase in the shareholder rights index 
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corresponds to a decrease in the payout ratio of 5.1% on average, ceteris paribus. On the other 
hand, an increase of ten percent in the creditor rights index increases the dividend payout ratio by 
2.06% on average. Our results that cross-country differences in shareholder rights have a more 
substantial impact than those in creditor rights, are in contrast to those found by Brockman and 
Unlu (2009), who observe that the impact of creditor rights on dividend policy is stronger than 
the one of shareholder rights for non-financial firms. This difference could be explained by the 
unique structure of banks’ funding and the pervasive safety net policies protecting creditors that 
reduce creditors’ incentives to discipline managers. 
 Our results further show that bank specific factors have a significant influence on bank 
dividend policy. We find that banks located in countries with stronger capital stringency pay 
higher dividends compared to banks under less regulatory pressure. We also find that 
undercapitalized banks pay less dividends, possibly to satisfy their capital requirements. 
Furthermore, banks with a higher proportion of funding provided by uninsured debtholders 
distribute more dividends. This result shows that uninsured debtholders of banks are unwilling to 
exert pressure on managers to pay less dividends. For the other control variables, our results 
show that banks which are larger, more profitable and have lower growth perspectives pay 
higher dividends, in line with Fama and French (2001). We also find that banks give lower 
dividend payouts when their risk is higher. This result supports the empirical finding of Hoberg 
and Prabhala (2009), who also show that firms’ propensity to pay dividends is lower when their 
risk is higher. We also find that banks pay higher dividends in countries with stronger 
competition in the banking industry and greater capital market depth. We do not find a 
significant impact of taxation on dividend payments. As banks in our sample have a dispersed 
ownership structure, this result is in line with Jacob et al. (2016), who find that dividend tax 
sensitivity sharply declines as the number of owners increases. Finally, our results show that 
banks pay higher dividends during crisis periods. This finding is in line with Acharya, et al. 
(2011) who show that during the global financial crisis in 2007-2008, banks kept paying very 
high dividends.  
 Overall, our empirical results show that dividend payments are a substitute mechanism for 
low levels of legal protection for both shareholders and creditors. Bank managers strike a 
balance in their dividend policy that depends on the relative strength of the agency conflict faced 
by their shareholders and creditors, with however a more decisive role played by the agency cost 
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of equity than the agency cost of debt. Our findings also show that bank funding structure, 
capital stringency and levels of capitalization have a significant influence on the dividend policy 
of banks. We are taking our investigation further now, by examining whether the way in which 
managers are subject to shareholders’ and managers’ pressures is also influenced directly by 
these different factors. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
5.2. Differential impact of bank specific factors 
5.2.1. Funding structure 
 We first examine hypothesis H2 that the pressure exerted by debtholders on bank dividend 
policy is stronger the greater the extent of uninsured market funding and the weaker are the 
creditor rights. As explained above, analogously to running Eq. (2), we estimate Eq. (1) on 
separate samples for banks with either lower or higher levels of long term market funding; 
results are provided in Table 4, columns 1 and 2. Our results show that the substitution 
hypothesis between dividend payments and weak creditor rights only applies for banks with a 
low level of market funding. This result is not in line with hypothesis H2 that a larger proportion 
of funds provided by uninsured debtholders might put pressure on managers to pay less 
dividends in countries with weaker creditor rights. However, it might indicate that more reliance 
on wholesale funding implies higher exposure to market scrutiny, which might lead to better 
alignment of the interests of managers and creditors, reducing the need to use dividends as a 
signaling mechanism. We further find that the substitution hypothesis between dividend 
payments and weak shareholder rights holds irrespective of the level of market funding. This 
indicates that shareholders consider that the level of market funding does not affect the 
willingness of managers to expropriate them. Looking at the economic significance of our 
results, we find that shareholder rights have a stronger impact than creditor rights in the case of 
low market funding. 
 
5.2.2. Capital stringency 
We next analyze if greater capital stringency can be a substitute mechanism for dividend 
payments in countries with weak legal protection. If this were the case, we would expect 
dividend payments to be used by managers to reinforce their reputation, for both shareholders 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
20 
 
and creditors, only in countries with weak legal protection. We re-run Eq. (1) on separate 
samples for countries with either lower or higher capital stringency (analogously to running Eq. 
(3)). We find a significant and positive relationship between the level of creditor rights and the 
dividend payout ratio, but only in countries with lower capital stringency (Table 4, columns 3 
and 4). The substitution hypothesis between dividend payments and weak creditor rights that we 
observed as holding for the full sample now only applies in countries where capital stringency is 
relatively low. This is consistent with the hypothesis H3 that high capital stringency can override 
managers’ incentives to signal their reputation by paying less dividends in countries with weaker 
creditor protection. We also find that the substitution hypothesis between dividend payments and 
shareholder rights only holds in countries with higher levels of capital stringency. This implies 
that, from the perspective of shareholders, potential for managers to expropriate them is not 
reduced by higher degrees of capital stringency, in contrast to debtholders. Examination of the 
economic significance of our results reconfirms that shareholder rights have a stronger impact 
than creditor rights in the case of low capital stringency.  
 
5.2.3. Level of capitalization 
 We also similarly investigate the role played by the level of capitalization in this context. The 
results in Table 4 (columns 5 and 6) show that the relationship between dividend payments and 
shareholder rights is not affected by the level of bank equity. We find that the substitution 
hypothesis between dividend payments and creditor rights holds only for banks with a relatively 
high level of capitalization, irrespective of the measure of capitalization used, in line with 
hypothesis H4. The reason for the substitution hypothesis not holding for banks with lower levels 
of regulatory capital could be that managers are restrained from using dividends as a signaling 
instrument when regulatory capital levels are low. Our results also indicate that shareholders do 
not consider that the level of bank equity might affect the incentives of managers to engage in 
expropriation. However, when we consider the level of the capital adequacy ratio instead of the 
leverage ratio, we find that the substitution hypothesis between dividend payments and weak 
shareholder rights only holds for banks with a regulatory capital ratio well above minimum 
requirements (columns 7 and 8), again in line with hypothesis H4. As for the economic 
significance of our results, we again observe that shareholder rights have a stronger impact than 
creditor rights when levels of capitalization are high.  
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 [Insert Table 4] 
 
6. Further issues and robustness checks 
6.1. Extensions 
 We now examine several additional factors that could also have an impact on how dividend 
payments are influenced by the strength of the agency conflicts related to shareholders and 
debtholders: the quality of law enforcement, the degree of financial market efficiency, the degree 
of bank competition, and the level of bank risk. For that, we augment Eq. (1) with interaction 
terms between the proxies measuring the strength of the agency conflicts and the dummy 
variable Factorijt as follows:  
𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠. 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 
+  𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑗  + 𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠. 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 
                                      ∑ 𝜃𝑚𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  
𝑛𝑚
        (5) 
  
 The first factor we consider is the quality of law enforcement. As highlighted by Claessens 
and Yurtoglu (2013), while the formal definition of property rights matters, the degree of 
enforcement of these rights is also an important determinant of the strength of conflicts of 
interest between managers and their stakeholders; this could therefore have an impact on the 
relationship between dividend policy and shareholder and creditor rights. To examine this aspect, 
we use two alternative indices to measure the quality of enforcement of legal rights in the 
judicial system: an index measuring the quality of law enforcement (the rule of law index from 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank)) and an index of the efficiency of debt 
enforcement computed by Djankov et al. (2008a). The rule of law index, ROLjt reflects 
perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts; it 
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with a higher index indicating stronger law enforcement. The efficiency 
of debt enforcement index DebtEnforcementj is computed using detailed information on 
collateral systems, structure of appeals, efficiency of votes among creditors, and bankruptcy 
systems; it ranges from 0 (weak enforcement) to 100 (strong enforcement).  
 Secondly, we examine whether efficient financial markets and bank competition may act as 
either substitutes or complements to dividend policies in reducing agency conflicts. Well-
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functioning and efficient financial markets are important to enable the different stakeholders to 
better distinguish good from bad managers as well as profitable from negative value investment 
projects (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1993). We use several indicators reflecting different aspects of 
whether financial markets are well-functioning and efficient. First, to represent the degree of 
financial market development, we use the market capitalization to GDP ratio as a proxy for 
financial market depth (CapDepthjt). We then use the turnover ratio, defined as the ratio of the 
value of total shares traded to market capitalization, to measure the efficiency of the stock market 
(CapEfficiencyjt). Higher turnover compared to capitalization represents relatively higher 
volumes of trading in the market, and thus more liquidity and greater scope for price discovery, 
improved transmission of information through prices, and greater market efficiency. We 
furthermore use the disclosure requirement index provided by the World Bank to measure the 
quality of information disclosed in financial markets (Disclosurej); it ranges from 0 to 10, with 
higher values indicating more extensive disclosure requirements. Regarding bank competition, 
we use two measures: the country-level Lerner index (described in Section 4.2.), and 
alternatively the Herfindahl Index (HHIjt) of bank market shares in terms of total assets. It has 
been shown that intense product market competition impels managers to behave efficiently, with 
competition acting as a disciplinary force by removing incompetent managers from the market 
(Hart, 1983; Holmstrom, 1982). Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) go further by arguing that 
product market competition can be viewed as either an alternative or a complement to 
shareholder rights in aligning managerial and shareholder incentives.  
 Finally, we also investigate if the level of bank risk shapes the influence of shareholder and 
creditor rights on dividend policy. We use three alternative measures of bank risk: insolvency 
risk (LnZscoreijt), bank earnings volatility (SdROAijt)
 
and systematic risk (Betaijt), as defined in 
Table 1.  
 As for Eqs. (2)-(4), we follow Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) and Shao et al. (2013) and run 
Eq. (1) using subsamples based on high and low values of each index/variable instead of running 
Eq. (5) directly; results are presented in Tables 5 to 8. We find that lower creditor rights are 
associated with higher dividend payments, but only in countries with higher efficiency of debt 
enforcement (Table 5), stock market efficiency, financial market disclosure (Table 6) and 
competition (Table 7). These additional factors are therefore complements to creditor rights in 
disciplining managers. Our results also show that the substitution hypothesis between dividend 
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payments and weak shareholder rights holds irrespective of the levels of legal rights enforcement 
and financial market efficiency; this indicates that, for shareholders, the potential for being 
expropriated by managers is not reduced by any of these factors. 
 Our results in Table 8 show a negative and significant impact of shareholder rights on 
dividend payments irrespective of the degree of bank risk. However, the effect of creditor rights 
on dividend payout ratios is only significant for banks with higher bank risk. This result indicates 
that in countries where the agency cost of debt is high, managers of riskier banks have greater 
incentives to cut dividends to signal to creditors that they will not be expropriated. When bank 
risk is lower, creditors are more confident to be paid back their claims, and thus do not view the 
payment of dividends as a transfer of wealth.  
[Insert Tables 5 to 8] 
  
6.2. Robustness checks 
 We carry out several additional robustness checks on our empirical results.
l
   
Alternative econometric specifications and method of estimation  
  
 We use the ratio of dividends to total assets (Div/TAijt) as an alternative variable to measure 
the dividend payout. Tables A3 and A4 (in Appendix A) show that we obtain similar results to 
those obtained in Tables 3 and 4 when we use this alternative measure as the dependent variable. 
 We then replace the variable Undercapitalized1ijt, which is based on the equity to total assets 
ratio and captures the level of (under)capitalization of the bank, with the variable 
Undercapitalized2ijt, which is alternatively based on the total regulatory capital ratio. Following 
the methodology in Lepetit et al. (2015), we alternatively use a partial adjustment model to 
estimate a bank-specific and time-varying target capital ratio and identify the bank's initial 
position relative to its target. We then compute a dummy variable which captures banks whose 
total equity to total assets ratio is below their target level. In both cases, our results remain 
unchanged; as before, banks that are undercapitalized or below their target level pay less 
dividends.       
 We also control for additional institutional and financial market features in Eqs. (1)-(4), 
including quality of law enforcement, efficiency of debt enforcement, stock market efficiency, 
                                                          
l
 Estimation results not included in this section are available on request. 
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and financial market disclosure. We further use two alternative measures of investment 
opportunities instead of the growth rate of total assets: the growth rate of total loans and the ratio 
of market value of equity to its book value. Again, our results remain unchanged.  
 We next examine if our results regarding the role played by market funding in the relationship 
between dividend payments and legal protection of creditors changes when we consider both 
long term and short term market funding. However, the results are similar to those obtained 
before, where we only considered long term market funding. 
 We furthermore use Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) instead of Hausman-Taylor 
estimations, as proposed by Plumper and Troeger (2007) and Plumper and Troeger (2011) to 
deal with time invariant estimation in fixed effects model. We obtain results that are again 
roughly similar.  
 
Sample restrictions 
 We furthermore test whether our results are driven by the large presence of U.S., Japanese 
and Russian banks. We create three subsamples: Panel A that excludes U.S. banks, Panel B that 
excludes Japanese banks, and Panel C that excludes Russian banks. We reexamine our Eqs. (1)-
(4); these estimations are reported in Tables A5-A8. We obtain results that are very similar to our 
previous findings. 
 Lastly, we run estimations excluding cooperative and savings banks from the sample to allow 
for the possibility that they might have different dividend policies. While all cooperative banks 
in our sample are listed, they are still partly owned by their members. As discussed by Emmons 
and Schmid (2002), cooperative banks could allocate benefits to their members through high 
deposit interest rates, low loan interest rates and dividends. They show that dividend payments 
depend on members’ preferences, trading off higher operating profits and dividends on one hand 
(profit-maximizing incentive), against more favorable deposit/loan prices on the other (output-
maximizing incentive). Moreover, as argued by Rasmusen (1988) and Gorton and Schmid 
(1999), the voting rights structure (“one member-one vote principle”) does not allow the 
constitution of block shareholders who can monitor managers. This might increase the ability of 
managers to divert firm resources. Our results remain, however, unchanged when we exclude the 
59 cooperative and savings banks we have in our sample (Tables A9 and A10). 
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7. Conclusion 
 We empirically investigate whether banks’ dividend payments are influenced by the relative 
strength of the various agency conflicts occurring between different stakeholders. More 
specifically, we analyze whether the strength of the agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders and/or between debtholders and shareholders have a significant impact on bank 
dividend policy on a global level. In this we follow La Porta, et al. (2000) and Brockman and 
Unlu (2009) in proxying the extent of the agency cost of equity and debt with the levels of 
shareholder protection and creditor rights, respectively. Our investigation thus contributes to the 
literature by examining whether or not bank dividend policy is determined by a balancing 
strategy between the pressures exerted by their shareholders and debtholders, taking into account 
banks’ specific funding structure and the particular regulatory environment faced by the banking 
industry. To carry out this investigation, we use a panel of 1,148 listed banks from 51 countries 
over the 2001-2014 period.  
 We find that both shareholder and creditor rights significantly influence banks’ dividend 
policy. Our results are consistent with the substitution hypothesis between dividend payments 
and both weak shareholder and creditor rights. These two results indicate that managers use 
dividends as a corporate governance mechanism to signal their unwillingness to expropriate 
either shareholders or creditors when their respective legal rights are weak. Looking at the 
economic significance of these two effects, we find that shareholder rights have a more 
substantial impact on dividend policy than creditor rights. This result, robust to various 
specifications, is in contrast to what is observed for non-financial firms; it can be explained by 
the unique structure of banks’ funding and the pervasive safety net policies protecting creditors.  
 Further investigations show that dividend policy can be used as a substitute mechanism to 
weak creditor rights only in the presence of either stricter capital stringency, strong competition 
in the banking market, well-functioning financial markets with strong levels of development and 
high disclosure quality, or strong levels of debt enforcement. We also find that higher levels of 
market funding involving greater exposure to market scrutiny reduce the importance of creditor 
rights. Regarding the pressure exerted by shareholders on managers, we find that the substitution 
hypothesis between dividend payments and weak shareholder rights holds independently of the 
competitive environment, financial market characteristics and banks’ funding structure. In other 
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words, shareholders do not consider that these different factors affect the incentives of managers 
to engage in expropriation. This could be explained by shareholders finding it difficult to detect 
expropriation behavior in financial firms due to banks’ inherent opacity. We furthermore find 
that there is no significant impact of shareholder and creditor rights on dividend payments for 
banks with low capital adequacy ratios, indicating that managers are restrained from using 
dividends as a signaling instrument when regulatory capital levels are low. 
 Overall our study contributes to the literature by showing the relevance of the substitution 
hypothesis based on the agency costs of equity and of debt for the important realm of financial 
firms. Our study highlights that bank managers strike a balance in their dividend policy that 
depends not only on the relative strength of the agency conflicts faced by their shareholders and 
creditors, with a more decisive role played by the agency cost of equity than the one of debt, but 
also on a variety of bank and market specific factors and the institutional environment. Our 
results for financial firms are opposite to the ones found in the literature on non-financial firms, 
where creditors play a more determinant role than shareholders in dividend policy decisions. 
This striking difference can be explained by the fact that banks are “special” in the sense that 
they benefit from pervasive safety net policies protecting creditors, reducing their incentives to 
discipline managers.  
The stronger pressure exerted by shareholders on the dividend decisions of managers, relative to 
the one of debtholders, could be viewed as harmful for banks as the interests of shareholders, 
unlike those of debtholders, are not generally aligned with the preferences of regulators and 
deposit insurers. Shareholders, particularly in countries with weak shareholder rights, prefer 
earnings to be distributed as dividends, reducing banks’ ability to generate capital internally with 
a potential transfer of default risk to creditors and the deposit insurer. As our findings, however, 
show that undercapitalized banks do not appear to face pressures from shareholders to use 
dividends as a signaling mechanism, this stronger influence of shareholders on banks’ dividend 
policy might not pose a substantial risk for banks’ financial health from a prudential standpoint, 
and thus mitigate the need to redress this balance with further regulatory intervention. 
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Table 1. Variable Definition.       
Variable Definition Source Mean SD Min Median Max 
Dependent Variables        
DP Dividends to net income.   BvD Bankscope 28.59 22.79 0 26.07 100 
Div/TA Dividend to total assets. ibid. 0.28 0.32 0 0.2 3.52 
        
Country Level Variables       
ShareholderRights Revised anti-director rights index The yes/no responses to the 
following elements are coded as 1/0: (i) if a country allows 
shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (ii) whether or 
not shareholders are required to deposit their shares prior to the 
General Shareholders’ Meeting, (iii) whether cumulative voting 
or proportional representation of minorities on the board of 
directors is allowed, (iv) if an oppressed minorities mechanism is 
in place, (v) if the minimum percentage of share capital that 
entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ 
Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median), 
and (vi) if shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be 
waived by a shareholders’ vote. The index ranges from 0 to 6, 
with higher value indicating stronger shareholder protection. 
La Porta, et al. 
(2000) and 
Djankov, et al. 
(2008b) 
3.54 1.09 1 4 5 
CreditorRights Creditor rights index. The yes/no responses to the following 
elements are coded as 1/0: (i) if creditors’ consent is required to 
file for reorganization, (ii) if secured creditors are able to take 
possession of collateral assets once the reorganization petition 
has been approved (no automatic stay), (iii) if secured creditors 
are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from 
the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm, and (iv) whether 
the debtor does not retain the administration of its property 
pending the resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges 
from 0 to 4, with higher value indicating stronger creditor 
protection. 
La Porta, et al. 
(1998) and 
Djankov, et al. 
(2007) 
2.02 1.03 0 2 4 
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CapString Capital Stringency index. The yes/no responses to the following 
questions are coded as 1/0: (1) Is the capital-asset ratio risk 
weighted in line with the Basel I guidelines? (2) Is the capital-
asset ratio risk weighted in line with the Basel II guidelines? (3) 
Does the minimum capital-asset ratio vary as a function of an 
individual bank’s credit risk? (4) Does the minimum capital-asset 
ratio vary as a function of market risk? (5) Before minimum 
capital adequacy is determined, which of the following are 
deducted from the book value of capital: Market value of loan 
losses not realized in accounting books? Unrealized losses in the 
securities portfolios? Unrealized foreign exchange losses? (6) 
What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital? 
(7) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the 
regulatory/supervisory authorities? (8) Can the initial 
disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with 
assets other than cash or government securities? (9) Can initial 
disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds? We follow 
the methodology used by Barth, et al. (2013) to harmonize the 
computation of the index over the four different surveys. The 
index ranges from 0 to 11, with higher value indicating stricter 
capital stringency. 
Bank regulation and 
supervision 
database (Barth, et 
al., 2013) - World 
Bank 
7.75 1.53 4 8.09 11 
HighCapString Dummy variable that equals one if the value of the variable 
CapString is greater than the sample median and zero otherwise. 
 
ibid. 0.45 0.38 0 0.38 1 
Tax Highest individual income tax rate. KPMG 36.32 8.74 10 35 62.28 
Lerner Country-level Lerner index computed as the average of bank-
level Lerner indices by country and by year (see Appendix B for 
the methodology used). 
BvD Bankscope 0.205 0.06 0.10 0.19 0.33 
HighCompetition Dummy variable that equals one if the value of the variable 
Lerner is lower than the sample median and zero otherwise. 
ibid. 0.50 0.34 0 0.52 1 
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CapDepth Ratio of market capitalization to gross domestic product.  Global Financial 
Development 
Database (GFDD) - 
World Bank 
37.02 44.93 0.18 20.73 177.46 
HighCapDepth Dummy variable that equals one if the value of the variable 
CapDepth is lower than the sample median and zero otherwise. 
ibid. 0.31 0.47 0 0 1 
Crisis Dummy variable that equals one if there is a banking crisis in the 
country j at date t and zero otherwise. 
GFDD - World 
Bank and country 
central banks 
0.11 0.16 0 0 0.53 
ROL Rule of Law score captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and 
in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence.  It ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher value indicating 
stronger law enforcement. 
 
World Governance 
Index Database - 
World Bank 
0.51 1.00 -1.24 0.50 1.93 
DebtEnforcement Measures the efficiency of debt enforcement. The efficiency 
index is built using a standardized case study of an insolvent firm 
(a hotel about to default on its debt). This case was submitted to 
insolvency practitioners in 88 countries around the world. These 
practitioners had to describe the different procedures available by 
law to solve the case (foreclosure, reorganization, liquidation), 
which of these procedures was likely to be used in each country 
and whether the firm would continue (or not) operating as a 
going concern through and upon the completion of the insolvency 
process. They also had to estimate the time and the costs (court 
fees, attorney fees, administrator fees, liquidation fees…) 
associated with the different steps of these procedures. Using this 
information, the efficiency index is computed as the present value 
of the terminal value of the firm after bankruptcy costs. It ranges 
from 0 (weak debt enforcement efficiency) to 100 (strong debt 
enforcement efficiency). The higher the index, the higher the 
value of the firm after bankruptcy costs.  
Djankov, et al. 
(2008a) 
60.22 26.79 6.6 58.8 96.1 
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CapEfficiency Ratio of value of total shares traded to market capitalization 
(turnover ratio).  
Global Financial 
Development 
Database (GFDD) - 
World Bank 
 
69.98 58.54 1.44 54.59 211.25 
Disclosure Disclosure requirement index. It measures the degrees to which 
corporations listed on local stock exchanges have to disclose 
relevant financial and other information. It ranges from 0 to 10, 
with higher values indicating more extensive disclosure 
requirements. 
 
La Porta et al. 
(2006) 
65.18 21.85 0 67 100 
HHI Herfindahl Index of bank market shares in terms of total 
assets, considering both listed and non-listed banks.  
 
ibid.      
Bank-Level Variables        
MarketFund/TF Ratio of long term market funding to total funding.  
 
BvD Bankscope 9.22 13.14 0 4.45 68.76 
HighMarketFund/TF Dummy variable that equals one if the value of the variable 
MarketFund/TF is greater than the country median and zero 
otherwise. 
ibid. 0.47 0.50 0 0 1 
Equity/TA Total equity to total assets ratio. 
 
ibid. 9.23 4.60 0.66 8.66 70.97 
Undercapitalized1 Dummy variable that equals one if the value of the variable 
Equity/TA is lower than the country median and zero otherwise. 
 
ibid. 0.50 0.50 0 0 1 
TCR Total weighted capital regulatory ratio. 
 
ibid. 14.23 4.14 1.1 13.43 55.39 
Undercapitalized2 Dummy variable that equals one if the value of TCR is lower than 
the country regulatory threshold plus two percent and zero 
otherwise. 
ibid. 0.05 0 0 0 1 
Size   Natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
ibid. 15.05 2.19 10.50 14.46 20.74 
ROA Return on assets. 
 
ibid. 0.83 0.96 -6.20 0.84 7.10 
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AssetGrowth Annual growth of total assets. 
 
ibid. 10.87 15.60 -25.40 6.97 121.82 
LnZscore Natural logarithm of Z-score. Z-score is defined as: (MROAijt+ 
Equity/TAijt)/SdROAijt, where MROAijt and SdROAijt are the 
moving average and standard deviation of return on assets (with a 
window width of 3 years), and Equity/TAijt is the equity to total 
assets ratio at date t. Higher Z-scores mean lower probabilities of 
default.  
ibid. 3.99 1.13 -0.06 4.08 6.56 
SdROA Standard deviation of return on assets (with a window width of 3 
years). 
 
ibid. 0.33 0.54 0.002 0.16 11.80 
Beta Measures the sensitivity of bank’s stock return to market return. 
Beta is computed using a standard single index market model.  
Bloomberg 1.02 1.63 -3.26 0.88 5.7 
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Table 2. Strength of agency conflicts and bank dividend payout ratios  
 
Dividend payout ratios (DP) 
 High Low Mean test: High-Low 
ShareholderRights 26.17 29.69 
-3.52*** 
(-6.14) 
CreditorRights 35.35 27.89 
7.46*** 
(8.22) 
Dividend payout ratio (DP) = Dividends to net income; ShareholderRights = Revised anti 
director index; CreditorRights = Creditor Rights Index. A country has a high/low level of 
shareholder rights if ShareholderRights is higher/lower than the sample median; a country has 
a high/low level of creditor rights if CreditorRights is higher/lower than the sample median. 
t-statistics are in brackets for null hypothesis of identical means are provided; ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for a bilateral test.  
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Table 3. Impact of agency costs of debt and equity on bank dividend policy.   
Dependent: DP HT RE FE 
ShareholderRights -4.10*** -3.88***   
  (-4.69) (-3.46)   
CreditorRights 2.92*** 3.67**   
  (2.79) (2.55)   
HighCapString 4.92*** 4.32* 4.75 
  (4.16) (1.77) (1.66) 
HighMarketFund/TF 1.41** 1.31* 1.40*** 
  (2.22) (1.85) (4.00) 
Undercapitalized1 -4.10*** -4.30*** -4.04*** 
  (-5.33) (-8.80) (-11.89) 
HighCompetition 4.33*** 3.84*** 4.32*** 
  (6.46) (5.30) (5.83) 
HighCapitalDepth 7.70*** 6.61***   
  (5.18) (2.89)   
Tax -0.06 0.05 -0.22 
  (-0.67) (0.40) (-0.56) 
Size 3.57*** 1.97*** 3.20 
  (3.74) (5.99) (1.32) 
ROA 2.14*** 2.81*** 2.10*** 
  (5.96) (6.21) (4.39) 
AssetGrowth -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.05** 
  (-3.04) (-5.11) (-2.36) 
LnZscore 1.63*** 2.20*** 1.60*** 
  (5.59) (4.16) (4.32) 
Crisis 2.74** 2.05 2.59** 
  (2.58) (1.63) (2.21) 
Constant -33.63*** -16.31* -25.32 
  (-3.03) (-1.74) (-0.54) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 7336 7336 7336 
No. Banks 1148 1148 1148 
R-squared within   0.11 0.11 
R-squared overall   0.10 0.16 
Hausman test FE vs HT; FE vs RE 9.06 247.35   
Chi-sq P-value 0.875 0.000   
This table reports Hausman-Taylor (HT), Random Effects (RE), and Fixed Effects (FE) regressions; Standard 
errors are clustered by bank. Variable definitions: DP = Dividends to net income; ShareholderRights = Revised 
anti director index; CreditorRights = Creditor Rights Index; HighCapString = takes the value of one if the 
capital stringency index is higher than the sample median; HighMarketFund/TF = takes the value of one if long 
term market funding/total funding is higher than the country median; Undercapitalized1 = takes the value of one 
if total equity/total assets is lower than the country median; HighCompetition = takes the value of one if the 
country-level Lerner index is lower than the sample median; HighCapDepth = takes the value of one if market 
capitalization/GDP is greater than the sample median; Tax = highest individual income tax rates; Size = 
logarithm of total assets; ROA = Return on assets; AssetGrowth  = Annual growth of total assets; LnZscore = 
logarithm of Z-score; Crisis = takes the value of one if there is a banking crisis. t-statistics are in parentheses, 
with p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. 
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Table 4. Bank dividend policy, agency conflicts and bank-level characteristics (Hausman-Taylor estimator). 
  Market Funding   Capital Stringency   Capitalization   TCR 
Dependent: DP High Low   High Low   High Low   High Low 
ShareholderRights -4.15*** -3.35***   -7.17*** -1.57   -4.33*** -3.37***   -3.22*** -4.70 
  (-3.86) (-2.83)   (-5.04) (-1.50)   (-4.15) (-2.78)   (-3.29) (-1.64) 
CreditorRights 0.53 4.39***   3.13* 3.56***   3.92*** 0.78   3.84*** 4.79 
  (0.40) (3.46)   (1.89) (2.91)   (3.18) (0.55)   (3.60) (1.40) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 3428 3908   4763 2573   3700 3636   6254 296 
No. Banks 806 837   872 692   859 815   1042 149 
Hausman test FE vs HT 9.29 5.70   21.71 6.42   9.44 3.92   15.81 2.32 
Chi-sq P-value 0.861 0.984   0.116 0.972   0.854 0.998   0.395 0.999 
A bank has a high level of market funding if its long term funding to total funding ratio (MarketFund/TF) is higher than the country median. A country has high capital 
stringency if its capital stringency index (CapString) is higher than the sample median. A bank has a high level of capitalization when its equity to total assets ratio 
(Equity/TA) is higher than the country median. A bank has a low total regulatory capital ratio (TCR) when its TCR is lower than the country regulatory threshold plus two 
percent. Variable definitions: DP = Dividends to net income; ShareholderRights = Revised anti director index; CreditorRights = Creditor Rights Index; t-statistics are in 
parentheses, with p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
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Table 5. Bank dividend policy, agency conflicts and legal rights enforcement (Hausman-Taylor estimator). 
Dependent: DP Rule of Law   Debt Enforcement 
 
High Low   High Low 
ShareholderRights -7.25*** -5.71***   -4.55** -10.89*** 
  (-3.42) (-4.27)   (-2.33) (-2.96) 
CreditorRights 2.83* -2.06   4.49** -3.47 
  (1.72) (-1.04)   (2.50) (-1.30) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 5898 1438   5758 1177 
No. Banks 900 265   866 222 
Hausman test FE vs. HT 4.9 15.93   5.16 10.98 
p-value 0.993 0.253   0.991 0.612 
A country has high rule of law if its Rule of Law index (ROL) is greater than the sample median. A country has high 
debt enforcement if its debt enforcement efficiency index (DebtEnforcement) is higher than the sample median. 
Variable definitions: DP = Dividends to net income; ShareholderRights = Revised anti director index; CreditorRights 
= Creditor Rights Index. t-statistics are in parentheses, with p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. Standard errors are 
clustered by bank. 
 
 
Table 6. Bank dividend policy, agency conflicts and functioning of financial markets (Hausman-Taylor 
estimator). 
Dependent: DP Capital Depth   
Capital Market 
Efficiency   Disclosure 
  High Low   High Low   High Low 
ShareholderRights -9.53*** -5.51***   -5.31*** -1.24   -14.62*** -3.79** 
  (-3.16) (-3.27)   (-3.62) (-0.62)   (-4.19) (-2.46) 
CreditorRights 4.13* 0.95   3.80*** 0.45   7.91*** -1.60 
  (1.94) (0.46)   (3.13) (0.27)   (4.09) (-0.93) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 5552 1814   6332 425   5791 966 
No. Banks 821 327   1019 109   848 186 
Hausman test FE vs. HT 4.52 4.27   5.12 1.11   7.20 11.3 
p-value 0.995 0.37   0.973 0.99   0.952 0.731 
A country has high capital depth if its ratio of market capitalization to GDP (CapDepth) is higher than the sample 
median. A country has high capital market efficiency if the value of total shares traded to market capitalization 
(CapEfficiency) is higher than the sample median. A country has high disclosure requirements of its disclosure 
requirements index (Disclosure) is higher than the sample median. Variable definitions: DP = Dividends to net 
income; ShareholderRights = Revised anti director index; CreditorRights = Creditor Rights Index; t-statistics are in 
parentheses, with p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
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Table 7. Bank dividend policy, agency conflicts and bank competition (Hausman-Taylor 
estimator). 
Dependent: DP Competition1   Competition2 
  High Low   High Low 
ShareholderRights -2.89** -3.91***   -3.18*** -4.21*** 
  (-2.25) (-4.05)   (-3.69) (-3.10) 
CreditorRights 3.51*** 1.70   2.72* -2.05 
  (2.87) (1.37)   (1.95) (-1.15) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 3061 4275   6384 952 
No. Banks 903 1005   1006 215 
Hausman test FE vs. HT 8.3 13.19   8.52 5.45 
p-value 0.911 0.588   0.901 0.987 
A country has a high degree of competition in its banking system if its country-level Lerner index 
(Lerner) is lower than the sample median (Competition1). Alternatively, a country has a high degree of 
competition if its Herfindahl Index of bank market shares in terms of total assets (HHI) is lower than 
the sample median (Competition2). Variable definitions: DP = Dividends to net income; 
ShareholderRights = Revised anti director index; CreditorRights = Creditor Rights Index; t-statistics 
are in parentheses, with p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
 
Table 8. Bank dividend policy, agency conflicts and bank risk (Hausman-Taylor estimator). 
 
      
Dependent: DP Insolvency risk   Earnings volatility   Systematic risk 
 
High   Low   High Low   high low 
ShareholderRights -3.46***   -5.59***   -3.14*** -6.4***   -6.49*** -9.81*** 
  (-3.88)   (-4.21)   (-2.99) (-4.88)   (-5.29) (-4.30) 
CreditorRights 4.69***   2.10   3.04** -0.31   2.81** -1.61 
  (3.21)   (1.62)   (2.43) (-0.16)   (2.29) (-0.57) 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Controls Yes   Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 3671   3665   3498 3498   3498 3498 
No. Banks 915   964   956 876   956 876 
Hausman test FE vs. HT 4.4   12.08   9.24 2.63   9.24 2.63 
p-value 0.996   0.673   0.865 0.99   0.865 0.99 
A bank has a high level of risk if its insolvency risk (LnZscore) is lower than the country median, or if its standard 
deviation of ROA (SdROA) is higher than the country median, or if its systematic risk (Beta) is higher than the country 
median. Variable definitions. DP = Dividends to net income.; ShareholderRights = Revised anti director index; 
CreditorRights = Creditor Rights Index. t-statistics are in parentheses, with p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. Standard 
errors are clustered by bank. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1. Distribution of banks by country and summary statistics for the period of 2001 – 2014. 
 No. of    Shareholder Creditor  
Country Name Banks Obs. DP (%) Rights Rights CapString 
Australia 10 71 66.79 4 3 10 
Austria 7 49 17.21 2.5 3 5 
Belgium 3 12 32.09 3 2 5.5 
Canada 8 60 39.99 4 1 7 
China 11 61 22.36 1 2 6 
Croatia 4 16 48.50 2.5 3 9 
Denmark 24 116 22.08 4 3 7 
Ecuador 2 16 31.62 2 0 8 
Egypt 7 27 39.93 3 2 9 
El Salvador 3 12 21.32 2 3 6 
France 22 109 19.09 3.5 0 9 
Germany 6 21 24.01 3.5 3 8 
Ghana 3 17 50.00 5 1 7 
Hong Kong 5 46 38.04 5 4 7 
India 34 264 20.09 5 2 10 
Indonesia 17 89 30.09 4 2 10 
Ireland 3 17 18.97 5 1 5 
Israel 5 23 11.09 4 3 9 
Italy 17 66 33.91 2 2 7 
Jamaica 2 10 32.06 4 2 10 
Japan 84 685 20.83 4.5 2 8 
Jordan 6 32 42.15 1 1 10 
Kazakhstan 7 25 3.63 4 2 9 
Kenya 7 54 30.68 2 4 7 
Lithuania 4 24 4.83 4 2 7 
Malaysia 7 42 26.03 5 3 5 
Morocco 5 20 44.01 2 1 9 
Netherlands 4 13 41.68 2.5 3 9 
Nigeria 9 38 47.01 4 4 5 
Norway 18 92 22.59 3.5 2 8 
Pakistan 7 28 30.60 4 1 9 
Peru 3 25 45.00 3.5 0 9 
Philippines 8 68 24.17 4 1 9 
Poland 11 50 37.13 2 1 9 
Portugal 3 24 36.68 2.5 1 8 
Republic of Korea 10 52 22.19 4.5 3 7 
Romania 3 19 36.36 5 1 9 
Russian Federation 55 289 0.00 4 2 8 
Singapore 7 45 39.07 5 3 8 
Slovakia 2 13 61.25 3 2 7 
South Africa 5 40 35.52 5 3 6 
Spain 14 81 33.80 5 2 9 
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Sri Lanka 7 47 19.15 4 2 6 
Sweden 2 22 42.90 3.5 1 4 
Switzerland 11 61 42.30 3 1 8 
Taiwan 13 37 37.67 3 2 8 
Thailand 8 46 35.96 4 2 10 
Turkey 11 60 13.18 3 2 11 
Ukraine 4 23 0.00 3 2 9 
United Kingdom 9 51 42.99 5 4 8 
United States 611 4,128 28.23 3 1 9 
Full sample median 7 42 32.06 4 2 8 
Total 1148 7336     
DP = Dividends to net income; ShareholderRights = Revised anti director index; CreditorRights = Creditor Rights 
Index; CapString = Capital stringency index (CapString). See Table 1 for definitions of variables. 
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Table A2. Correlation matrix. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 ShareholderRights 1.00                         
2 CreditorRights 0.50* 1.00                       
3 HighCapString -0.30* -0.48* 1.00                     
4 HighMarketFund/TF -0.02 -0.02 0.02 1.00                   
5 Undercapitalized1 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.07* 1.00                 
6 HighCompetition 0.07* 0.04* -0.04* 0.01 0.00 1.00               
7 HighCapDepth -0.16* -0.44* 0.21* 0.02 0.01 -0.16* 1.00             
8 Size 0.30* 0.34* -0.26* 0.10* 0.07* 0.00 -0.14* 1.00           
9 ROA 0.02 0.11* -0.03* -0.00 -0.14* -0.01 -0.25* 0.04* 1.00         
10 AssetGrowth 0.05* 0.11* -0.02 -0.01 -0.06* 0.02* -0.26* -0.04* 0.22* 1.00       
11 LnZscore -0.04* -0.09* 0.05* -0.04* -0.11* -0.09* 0.13* -0.00 0.27* 0.02 1.00     
12 Tax 0.04* 0.07* -0.14* -0.01 -0.02 -0.18* 0.30* 0.28* -0.22* -0.25* 0.09* 1.00   
13 Crisis -0.17* -0.18* 0.20* 0.00 -0.02 0.42* 0.13* -0.14* -0.21* -0.12* -0.19* -0.14* 1.00 
Variable definitions: ShareholderRights = Revised anti director index; CreditorRights = Creditor Rights Index; HighMarketFund/TF = takes the value of one if long 
term market funding/total funding (MarketFund/TF) is higher than the country median; HighCapString = takes the value of one if the capital stringency index 
(CapString) is higher than the sample median; Undercapitalized1 = takes the value of one if the value of equity/total assets (Equity/TA) is lower than the country 
median; HighCompetition = takes the value of one if the country-level Lerner Index (Lerner) is lower than the sample median; HighCapDepth = takes the value of one 
if the value of market capitalization/GDP (CapDepth) is higher than the sample median; Size = logarithm of total assets; ROA = Return on assets; AssetGrowth  = 
Annual growth of total assets; LnZ Score = logarithm of Z-score; Tax = Highest personal income tax rate; Crisis = takes the value of one if there is a banking crisis. 
p<0.05* 
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Table A3. Robustness check with alternative dividend measure. 
Dependent: Div/TA HT 
ShareholderRights -0.051*** 
  (-3.06) 
CreditorRights 0.06*** 
  (2.57) 
HighMarketFund/TF 0.001 
  (0.08) 
Undercapitalized1 -0.03*** 
  (-3.87) 
HighCompetition 0.02*** 
  (3.07) 
HighCapitalDepth 0.09** 
  (2.05) 
Tax -0.01*** 
  (-4.04) 
Size 0.01 
  (0.57) 
ROA 0.07*** 
  (8.57) 
AssetGrowth -0.001*** 
  (-4.09) 
LnZscore 0.01*** 
  (3.44) 
Crisis -0.01 
  (-0.50) 
Constant 0.10 
  (0.62) 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Controls Yes 
No. Obs. 7877 
No. Banks 1154 
Hausman test FE vs HT 10.66 
Chi-sq P-value 0.639 
HT = Hausman-Taylor estimator. Variable definitions: Dependent variable: Div/TA = Dividends to 
total assets; ShareholderRights = Revised anti director index; CreditorRights = Creditor Rights Index; 
HighCapString = takes the value of one if the capital stringency index is higher than the sample median; 
HighMarketFund/TF = takes the value of one if long term market funding/total funding is higher than 
the country median; Undercapitalized1 = takes the value of one if total equity/total assets is lower than 
the country median; HighCompetition = takes the value of one if the country-level Lerner index is lower 
than the sample median; HighCapDepth = takes the value of one if market capitalization/GDP is greater 
than the sample median; Tax = highest individual income tax rates; Size = logarithm of total assets; 
ROA = Return on assets; AssetGrowth  = Annual growth of total assets; LnZscore = logarithm of Z-
score; Crisis = takes the value of one if there is a banking crisis. t-statistics are in parentheses, with 
p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
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Table A4. Robustness check with alternative dividend measure (Hausman-Taylor estimator). 
  Market Funding   Capital Stringency   Capitalization   TCR 
Dependent: Div/TA High Low   High Low   High Low   High Low 
ShareholderRights -0.049** -0.037*   -7.17*** -0.039*   -4.33*** -0.048**   -3.28*** -0.019 
  (-2.54) (-1.80)   (-5.04) (-1.81)   (-4.15) (-2.38)   (-3.36) (-0.62) 
CreditorRights 0.007 0.1***   3.14* 0.064**   3.92 0.014   3.74*** 0.059 
  (0.26) (3.13)   (1.89) (2.27)   (3.18) (0.59)   (3.51) (0.70) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 3741 4110   5157 2694   3989 3862   6690 307 
No. Banks 817 845   872 700   869 826   1046 156 
Hausman test FE vs HT 7.49 8.20   21.71 10.62   20.16 7.11   15.65 4.35 
Chi-sq P-value 0.943 0.915   0.116 0.779   0.166 0.954   0.406 0.996 
A bank has a high level of market funding if its long term funding to total funding ratio (MarketFund/TF) is higher than the country median. A country 
has high capital stringency if its capital stringency index (CapString) is higher than the sample median. A bank has a high level of capitalization when 
its equity to total assets ratio (Equity/TA) is higher than the country median. A bank has a low total regulatory capital ratio (TCR) when its TCR is 
lower than the country regulatory threshold plus two percent. Variable definitions: Div/TA = Dividends to total assets; ShareholderRights = Revised 
anti director index; CreditorRights = Creditor Rights Index; t-statistics are in parentheses, with p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***.  Standard errors are 
clustered by bank. 
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Table A5. Robustness check excluding alternatively US, Japan and Russia (Hausman-Taylor estimator). 
Dependent: DP Panel A (without US)    Panel B (without Japan)   Panel C (without Russia)  
ShareholderRights -4.46***   -2.90**   -3.85*** 
  (-5.09)   (-3.04)   (-4.31) 
CreditorRights 2.33**   3.25***   2.49** 
  (2.32)   (3.18)   (-2.45) 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes 
Controls Yes   Yes   Yes 
No. Obs. 3208   6651   7047 
No. Banks 537   1064   1093 
Hausman test FE vs. HT 12.44   18.28   4.64 
p-value 0.645   0.248   0.995 
Variable definitions: DP = Dividends to net income; ShareholderRights = Revised anti director index; CreditorRights = Creditor 
Rights Index. t-statistics are in parentheses, with p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
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Table A6. Robustness check excluding US (Hausman-Taylor estimator). 
  Market Funding   Capital Stringency   Capitalization   TCR 
Dependent: DP High Low   High Low   High Low   High Low 
ShareholderRights -2.46** -4.66***   -4.82*** -2.79**   -4.37*** -3.40***   -5.28*** -6.66* 
  (-2.18) (-4.16)   (-3.18) (-2.05)   (-3.58) (-2.48)   (-4.99) (-1.76) 
CreditorRights 0.95 3.29***   6.32** 3.26***   3.01** 1.01   2.44** 5.15 
  (0.78) (2.72)   (2.43) (2.82)   (2.41) (0.82)   (2.04) (1.46) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 1439 1769   1153 2055   1642 1566   2196 226 
No. Banks 384 413   277 411   402 384   431 109 
Hausman test FE vs HT 9.06 9.43   7.21 6.26   15.61 7.18   21.44 1.69 
Chi-sq P-value 0.874 0.854   0.926 0.951   0.409 0.952   0.123 0.99 
A bank has a high level of market funding if its long term funding to total funding ratio (MarketFund/TF) is higher than the country median. A 
country has high capital stringency if its capital stringency index (CapString) is higher than the sample median. A bank has a high level of 
capitalization when its equity to total assets ratio (Equity/TA) is higher than the country median. A bank has a low total regulatory capital 
ratio (TCR) when its TCR is lower than the country regulatory threshold plus two percent. Variable definitions: DP = Dividends to net income; 
ShareholderRights = Revised anti director index; CreditorRights = Creditor Rights Index; t-statistics are in parentheses, with p<0.1*, 
p<0.05** and p<0.01***. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
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Table A7. Robustness check excluding Japan (Hausman-Taylor estimator). 
  Market Funding   Capital Stringency   Capitalization   TCR 
Dependent: DP High Low   High Low   High Low   High Low 
ShareholderRights -3.04** -2.02   -7.17*** -0.49   -3.24*** -2.24   -3.22*** -4.70 
  (-2.44) (-1.55)   (-5.04) (-0.42)   (-2.67) (-1.64)   (-3.29) (-1.64) 
CreditorRights 0.38 5.16***   3.14* 2.75**   4.18*** 1.05   3.84*** 4.79 
  (0.29) (4.03)   (1.89) (2.29)   (3.43) (0.76)   (3.60) (1.40) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 3116 3535   4763 1888   3326 3325   6254 296 
No. Banks 734 768   872 608   796 756   1042 149 
Hausman test FE vs HT 6.71 17.53   21.71 14.29   21.38 3.53   15.81 2.32 
Chi-sq P-value 0.965 0.288   0.116 0.503   0.125 0.998   0.395 0.99 
A bank has a high level of market funding if its long term funding to total funding ratio (MarketFund/TF) is higher than the country median. A country 
has high capital stringency if its capital stringency index (CapString) is higher than the sample median. A bank has a high level of capitalization when 
its equity to total assets ratio (Equity/TA) is higher than the country median. A bank has a low total regulatory capital ratio (TCR) when its TCR is 
lower than the country regulatory threshold plus two percent. Variable definitions: DP = Dividends to net income; ShareholderRights = Revised anti 
director index; CreditorRights = Creditor Rights Index; t-statistics are in parentheses, with p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. Standard errors are 
clustered by bank. 
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Table A8. Robustness check excluding Russia (Hausman-Taylor estimator). 
  Market Funding   Capital Stringency   Capitalization   TCR 
Dependent: DP High Low   High Low   High Low   High Low 
ShareholderRights -3.61*** -3.22***   -7.03*** -0.1   -3.56*** -3.46***   -2.89*** -4.79* 
  (-3.25) (-2.79)   (-5.01) (-0.10)   (-3.41) (-2.27)   (-3.08) (-1.70) 
CreditorRights 0.66 3.87***   3.42** 2.63**   3.68*** 0.02   3.29*** 5.71* 
  (0.51) (3.19)   (2.01) (2.42)   (3.14) (0.01)   (3.25) (1.67) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 3275 3535   4719 2328   3551 3496   5983 278 
No. Banks 763 768   857 638   815 775   987 141 
Hausman test FE vs HT 4.63 4.11   19.25 11.67   8.97 5.79   11.91 2.06 
Chi-sq P-value 0.995 0.997   0.203 0.708   0.879 0.983   0.686 0.99 
A bank has a high level of market funding if its long term funding to total funding ratio (MarketFund/TF) is higher than the country median. A country has 
high capital stringency if its capital stringency index (CapString) is higher than the sample median. A bank has a high level of capitalization when its 
equity to total assets ratio (Equity/TA) is higher than the country median. A bank has a low total regulatory capital ratio (TCR) when its TCR is lower than 
the country regulatory threshold plus two percent. Variable definitions: DP  = Dividends to net income; ShareholderRights = Revised anti director index; 
CreditorRights = Creditor Rights Index; t-statistics are in parentheses, with p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
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Table A9. Robustness check excluding cooperative and savings banks (Hausman-Taylor 
estimator). 
Dependent: DP Without Cooperative and Savings banks 
ShareholderRights -3.44*** 
  (-4.61) 
CreditorRights 3.08*** 
  (3.13) 
HighMarketFund/TF 1.51*** 
  (2.28) 
Undercapitalized1 -4.22*** 
  (-5.28) 
HighCompetition 4.12*** 
  (5.75) 
HighCapitalDepth 8.12*** 
  (5.23) 
Tax -0.12 
  (-1.29) 
Size 8.66*** 
  (4.88) 
ROA 2.08*** 
  (5.7) 
AssetGrowth -0.06*** 
  (-3.350) 
LnZscore 1.67*** 
  (5.63) 
Crisis 2.90*** 
  (2.64) 
Constant 22.24*** 
  (4.59) 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Controls Yes 
No. Obs. 6989 
No. Banks 1089 
Hausman test FE vs HT 9.38 
Chi-sq P-value 0.857 
Variable definitions: DP = Dividends to net income; ShareholderRights = Revised anti director index; 
CreditorRights = Creditor Rights Index; HighCapString = takes the value of one if the capital 
stringency index is higher than the sample median; HighMarketFund/TF = takes the value of one if long 
term market funding/total funding is higher than the country median; Undercapitalized1 = takes the 
value of one if total equity/total assets is lower than the country median; HighCompetition = takes the 
value of one if the country-level Lerner index is lower than the sample median; HighCapDepth = takes 
the value of one if market capitalization/GDP is greater than the sample median; Tax = highest 
individual income tax rates; Size = logarithm of total assets; ROA = Return on assets; AssetGrowth  = 
Annual growth of total assets; LnZscore = logarithm of Z-score; Crisis = takes the value of one if there 
is a banking crisis. t-statistics are in parentheses, with p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. Standard 
errors are clustered by bank. 
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Table A10. Robustness check excluding cooperative and savings banks (Hausman-Taylor estimator). 
  Market Funding   Capital Stringency   Capitalization   TCR 
Dependent: DP High Low   High Low   High Low   High Low 
ShareholderRights -4.28*** -2.19**   -5.81*** -1.69   -4.32*** -3.35**   -3.41*** -3.35 
  (-3.78) (-2.67)   (-4.08) (-1.50)   (-3.17) (-2.58)   (-3.34) (-1.22) 
CreditorRights -0.27 4.17***   4.62* 3.49***   3.73*** 0.21   3.58*** 3.93 
  (-0.19) (2.86)   (1.82) (2.62)   (2.70) (0.13)   (2.90) (1.14) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 3261 3908   4590 2399   3501 3488   5937 276 
No. Banks 765 837   837 641   810 773   985 140 
Hausman test FE vs HT 6.5 6.05   20.33 7.86   9.25 3.71   18.2 2.5 
Chi-sq P-value 0.97 0.979   0.159 0.929   0.864 0.998   0.252 0.99 
A bank has a high level of market funding if its long term funding to total funding ratio (MarketFund/TF) is higher than the country median. A country has high 
capital stringency if its capital stringency index (CapString) is higher than the sample median. A bank has a high level of capitalization when its equity to total 
assets ratio (Equity/TA) is higher than the country median. A bank has a low total regulatory capital ratio (TCR) when its TCR is lower than the country 
regulatory threshold plus two percent. Variable definitions: DP = Dividends to net income; ShareholderRights = Revised anti director index; CreditorRights = 
Creditor Rights Index; t-statistics are in parentheses, with p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
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Appendix B 
 
We follow Love and Peria (2015) to estimate the Lerner index. We first estimate marginal cost 
by using the translog cost function; we then compute the Lerner index as the difference between 
price and marginal cost relative to price: 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
1
2
𝛼2(𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴)𝑖;𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
3
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗 𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘
3
𝑘=1
𝑙𝑛
3
𝑗=1
𝑤𝑗 𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘 𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗
3
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                   (𝑖) 
𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
(𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗 𝑖,𝑡
3
𝑗=1
)                                     (𝑖𝑖) 
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
                                                                           (𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
Where subscript i and t denote bank i and time t; lnTC is the logarithm of total cost; lnTA is the 
logarithm of total assets; lnw is the logarithm of input cost, where inputs are: w1, the ratio of 
interest expenses to total deposits; w2, the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets; and w3, the 
ratio of other operating and administrative expenses to total assets. MC is marginal cost, and 
Price is bank’s revenues (interest income and non-interest income). Equation (i) is estimated for 
each country using fixed effects; we then compute a country’s Lerner index for each year t by 
averaging the Lerner indices of banks from Equation (iii) for year t.  
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Highlights: 
 Analyze bank dividends relative to agency conflicts of shareholders & creditors. 
 Bank dividends influenced more by agency cost of equity than the one of debt. 
 Investigate impact of funding structure, capitalization and capital stringency. 
 Also examine role of differences in external corporate governance mechanisms. 
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